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Commentary
Crowd-sourcing the smart city:




Using Big Data to better understand urban questions is an exciting field with challenging methodological and theoretical
problems. It is also, however, potentially troubling when Big Data (particularly derived from social media) is applied
uncritically to urban governance via the ideas and practices of ‘‘smart cities’’. This essay reviews both the historical depth
of central ideas within smart city governance —particular the idea that enough data/information/knowledge can solve
society problems—but also the ways that the most recent version differs. Namely, that the motivations and ideological
underpinning behind the goal of urban betterment is largely driven by technology advocates and neoliberalism rather
than the strong social justice themes associated with earlier applications of data to cities. Geosocial media data and
metrics derived from them can provide useful insight and policy direction. But one must be ever mindful that metrics
don’t simply measure; in the process of deciding what is important and possible to measure, these data are simultan-
eously defining what cities are.
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‘‘Our broad research question is using social media
data to run a city better.’’ (Email from an urban
informatics professional, March 2015)
The email quoted above arrived in my inbox in 2015
and is representative of an increasingly common refrain
as Big Data and related analytics gain purchase within
urban planning and geography. Based loosely under the
broad and multi-faceted idea of ‘‘smart cities’’ (see
Albino et al., 2015) the question voiced in this email
represents an exciting field with challenging data, meth-
odological and theoretical problems that has precipi-
tated thoughtful discussions across disciplines.
Nevertheless, this particular email gave me pause,
especially the phrase ‘‘using social media data to run
a city better’’ with all its technocratic and reductionist
overtones.1 To be clear, I have used social media data
extensively in my work in Urban Geography. Still the
mindset I saw displayed in this email is one that is often
found in smart city policy approaches (Lehrer, 2010;
see Townsend, 2013 for similar assessment), and one
that I find troubling, given the complex challenges in
using social media data (and other ‘‘Big Data’’ sources)
to produce meaningful insights, particular in the cause
of making cities better.
This essay represents my assessment of how the
related issues of Big Data and social media have been
(and are being) brought to action in urban governance
via the ideas and practices of ‘‘smart cities’’. Although I
contend a key task for work on smart cities is ground-
ing ‘‘analysis in the actually existing cities, territories
and relationalities where these policies are being con-
structed and implemented’’ (Shelton et al., 2014: 10)
this commentary takes a more macro perspective,
with the goal of unpacking rather than accepting
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the idealized version both used by some proponents
and critics.
Histories of smart(er) cities
While the term smart city is widely evoked, the visions
and actual practices of smart cities are quite diverse
belying anything as simple as a single model. For exam-
ple, Batty et al. (2012: 481) characterize smart cities
broadly as a new way to understand and address
urban problems ‘‘in which ICT is merged with trad-
itional infrastructures, coordinated and integrated
using new digital technologies’’. This scoping of smart
city projects across the full range of urban governance
tasks and interlocking urban systems is also noted by
Albino et al. (2015: 6–8) who outline over 20 examples
ranging from the relatively simple metric of informa-
tion technologies diffusion to deep organizational
changes to communities often including new roles for
private actors and citizens. In short, the idea of the
smart city is unruly and multi-faceted, and beyond an
increase reliance upon information technologies can
vary widely in actual practice.
Moreover the idea of improving quality of life via
information-mediated cities is not without historical
precedent. While some have pointed towards work
from the late 1980s and 1990s on so-called ‘cybercities’
and other such visions of an ICT-mediated urban
experience (Batty, 1997; Castells, 1989), the real precur-
sors to the contemporary vision of the smart city
go much, much further back in time. By limiting our
historical analysis only to the last two decades since
the growth of the internet, we risk missing the more
fundamental connection of these contemporary urban
policy trends to longstanding ideas within planning
practice and urban governance. In short, smart cities
are not due to the specific availability of certain new
information and communication technologies, but are
a continuation of the longstanding use of techno-
scientific ideology as a kind of universal justification
for planning. The actual priorities for intervention—be
it growth machine economic development, mass transit,
sustainability or even suburbanization—are generally
derived from the localized (or regionalized) understand-
ings of urban planners and municipal politicians
that adopt smart city terminology to meet pre-existing
goals.
Furthermore, the visions of the smart city typically
invoke, albeit often implicitly, are echoes of the classic
urban ideas of Ebenezer Howard and his orderly
‘garden cities’, or even Patrick Geddes and his regional
observatory in Edinburgh. But it is not only these pion-
eers of urban theory that the smart city and its propon-
ents draw on, but also the ideas of the RAND
Corporation and other Cold War-era institutions who
appealed to the supposedly inherent qualities of tech-
noscience to guide urban planning (Light, 2003). And
while the resurgence of hyper-rational, technoscientific
planning may seem new when cast against the backdrop
of the postmodern turn over the last two decades or so,
the history of urban planning has many such swings of
the pendulum (LeGates et al., 2009).
An especially intriguing, late-midcentury example of
this approach is the Project Cybersyn (Proyecto Synco
in Spanish) enacted during the socialist Allende regime
during the early 1970s in Chile which viewed cybernet-
ics as a technology of liberation (Medina, 2011; see also
Crampton, 2015). With a vision and goal set that fore-
shadows the rhetoric of the 21st century smart cities,
Project Cybersyn ‘‘was an attempt to build a computer
system for real-time economic control’’ and included
the ‘‘creation of a futuristic operations room where
members of the government could convene, quickly
grasp the state of the economy, and make rapid deci-
sions informed by recent data’’ (Medina, 2011: 3, 6).
A key part of this vision was Project Cyberstride, a
series of information flows from manufacturing plants
(transmitted via Telex to a single centralized mainframe
computer) for collation and analysis at the operations
center (see Figure 1). The goal was to address problems
within the supply chains of interlinking industries and
factories in an anticipatory manner rather than simply
reacting to a sudden crisis (Medina, 2011: 86).
In addition to economic functions, Project Cybersyn
also sought to shift the scale at which data could be
collected and attempted to devise metrics that measured
the mood of the population. Although not imple-
mented, the plan envisioned devices called algedonic
meters connected to television sets (see Figure 1)
distributed around the country whose aggregated
(albeit apparently non-normalized) voltage readings
would be channeled to the operations center. These
meters were envisioned as ‘‘capable of measuring
how happy Chileans were with their government at
any given time. . . .Unlike polls these algedonic meters
would not limit or prompt answers by asking set ques-
tions . . . the meter did not require users to rationalize
their level of happiness or normalize it to fit on a uni-
form scale.’’ (Medina, 2011: 89). It is an evocative
notion, combining the ideologies of centralized socialist
planning and cybernetics focused on creating a more
equitable society.
The Project Cybersyn design was not dissimilar to
the vision of urban governance promoted more recently
in which cities are conceptualized as a ‘‘complex net-
work of interconnected systems’’ (IBM, 2010).
Moreover, just as the Cyberstride Telex network was
designed as an anticipatory rather than a reactive
system, smart cities seek to leverage information flows
in decision-making and thus ‘‘anticipating and
2 Big Data & Society
resolving problems proactively’’ (IBM, 2012). Although
the Project Cybersyn was abandoned by Pinochet mili-
tary dictatorship, it highlights the widespread appeal of
harnessing real-time data; metrics and informatics to
make economies and cities run better. There are some
rather obvious design parallels between Cybersyn’s
operations room and the current Rio de Janeiro’s
Intelligent Operations Center (see Figure 2) planned
to provide a range of data inputs via ‘‘live digital
maps . . . the GPS-tracked movements of the city’s gar-
bage truck fleet, current precipitation picked up by the
city’s brand-new Doppler radar and . . . live transmis-
sion . . . beamed from the dash-mounted camera of the
city’s eight thousand buses’’ (Townsend, 2013: 67–68).
The overlap in design sensibilities, however, are over-
shadowed by the differences in practice brought by
local priorities, i.e. Project Cybersyn sought to trans-
form basic economic structures while Rio pursues
the more prosaic goal of making existing city services
more efficient.
Although the specific technologies in play are new,
smart city governance has plenty of antecedents in
urban planning history (Hall, 1988), all with the laud-
able goal of making the cities run better. That said, the
ideologies and priorities associated with these strategies
have varied widely, from the socialist-based vision of
centralized planning in Allende’s Chile to the neoliberal
market based approaches promoted by technology pro-
viders to the preoccupation with security and service
provision of pre-Olympics Rio, resulting in decidedly
different interpretations of what ‘‘better’’ means.
Ideologies and smart cities
One of the tropes associated with smart cities is the
often-cited statistic that the majority of humanity is
currently living in cities, and this trend will only increase
in the future (National Intelligence Council, 2012). From
this starting point, smart cities are then identified as an
essential strategy for dealing with an urbanized future
Figure 1. (a) Operations room and (b) schematic for the Algedonic meter from Medina (2011: p.2 and p.90).
Figure 2. Rio de Janeiro’s intelligent operations center (Wilson, 2015).
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and its associated problem: what White (2016) character-
izes as an ideology based on a ‘‘shared orientation to the
future’’ and an ‘‘imperative for change’’. A standard set
of examples—Masdar in the United Arab Emirates,
Songdo in South Korea, and Living PlanIT Valley in
Portugal—are regularly called upon rhetorically even
though these ‘‘built from scratch’’ urban concentrations
are decidedly the exception rather than the rule. When
one looks at the cases of ‘‘the actually existing smart
city,’’ a much more complex picture emerges; in a major-
ity of cases, particularly in the developed world, smart
city governance is implemented via ad hoc process in
older cities. These projects come together via complex
negotiations and assemblages of technologies, policy-
makers, vendors and motivations (Shelton et al., 2014)
and unfold in the context of an ongoing neoliberal pro-
ject promoting privatization and the rollback of the state.
Branding and metrics
There has been plenty of critique of smart cities as a
product of neoliberalism that seeks to shift governmen-
tal services and infrastructure to private providers
(Greenfield, 2013; Halpern et al., 2013; Hollands, 2008;
Kitchin, 2014a; Vanolo, 2013). Indeed one might tie the
popularity of smart city governance to a certain hegem-
ony of thought (Gramsci, 1995) built upon ideologies
deeply integrated with everyday life, what Mirowski
(2013) names a sort of ‘‘folk’’ neoliberalism. This con-
ceptualization is useful as it captures how the vagueness
and diversity of smart cities imaginaries—some kind of
new technologically mediated system across multiple
urban systems—leverages a desire for change to existing
urban traditions without the need to specify what will
come instead.
Of course, any implementation of smart city policy is
shaped by the specific challenges of each city as well as
the existing ideologies associated with a particular strand
of urbanism, e.g. the welfare state of Europe or the free
market alignment of the U.S. Vanolo’s (2013: 12) case of
Italian cities highlights a particular urban utopian
imaginary tied to the smart city policies in Europe
(see also Hollands, 2015). These smart city opportunities
are also shaped by public funding opportunities—
focused at the city rather than regional scale—that is
creating a ‘‘new geometry of power relations’’ in Italy
and the larger European context (Vanolo, 2013: 12).
This contrasts with the US experience where foundation
and corporate funding have been more prominent than
state initiatives, at least until the 2016 U.S. Department
of Transportation Smart City Challenge.
Given the amount of marketing material from tech-
nology companies like IBM, Siemens and Cisco it has
become a bit of a cottage industry within the US to
critique smart city governance as the cat’s paw of
corporate intervention within cities. However, narra-
tives of smart cities as simply artifacts of technology
company marketing are overly simplistic as urban
policy makers pursue them for a range of reasons
(Shelton et al., 2014; Wiig, 2015). For example, smart
city policies are often rhetorically connected to com-
petitiveness in a global economy, both to make a city
an attractive location for investment but also to brand-
ing it as a technologically savvy and progressive place.
Again this is not simply a matter of pushing the agenda
of the for-profit sector but a mindset among urban offi-
cials that smart city policies are an important signal/
tool for competitiveness (see McCann, 2011). In fact,
the sparse evidence of the effectiveness of smart city
policies relative to other strategies (Wiig, 2015) makes
it difficult to promote on its own merits. In effect, smart
city governance is as much about branding opportu-
nities as it is about thoughtful public policy.
One of the key means by which smart city branding
emerges in urban governance is via Big Data and met-
rics. Data have long been a part of urban management
(e.g., the Telex flows in Allende’s Chile) but the practice
of neoliberalism has been accompanied by an intensifi-
cation of metrics (Brenner et al., 2010) and within
recent years with the rise of Big Data and smart
cities.2 In particular, metrics have become a key
means through which stories can be told (particularly
those of the techno-utopian variety aligned with the
economic interests of technology companies) and data
visualized in the roll out of smart cities. Again, this is
not new per se. Story-telling and visualizations have a
long history within advocacy and community planning
(Davidoff, 1965), radical geography/mapping (Bunge,
1971) and participatory Geographic Information
Science (GIS) (Elwood, 2006). These examples, how-
ever, had the explicit goal of working with marginalized
groups to produce alternative knowledge and narra-
tives to the dominant ones. More recently, one of the
possible benefits for crowd-sourced knowledge was the
potential to provide locally based information that
would otherwise not be collected by larger data aggre-
gators (Goodchild, 2007). Thus, it is somewhat ironic
that story-telling and data visualization have emerged
as a central element to technology companies’ market-
ing campaigns on smart cities (Söderström et al., 2014).
Building stories and identifying metrics
Two of the main stories (or tropes) used to promote
and justify smart cities policies are the twin crises of (1)
growing urban populations in an era of climate change
and (2) increased urban competition in an age of aus-
terity. Combined, these stories present a picture of an
uncertain future, with crises that need immediate
action, that are most effectively addressed via the
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inclusion of new information technology to existing
governance and institutional systems (White, 2016).
This urgency in turn leads to a solution—new streams
of Big Data, often crowd-sourced—that is cast as a key
and necessary means for addressing the crises identified
in the first two stories. While my primary interest is in
the role of metrics in smart city governance it is useful
to review the two stories that identify the specific set of
problems that smart city metrics can address.
The story of growing urban populations is based on
the observation that the majority of the world’s popu-
lation lives in urban areas.3 It is a story that most
urbanists find intrinsically appealing; it justifies our
own interests and predilections for scale both in terms
of research and approaches to governance. It does,
however, also contribute to a certain ossification in
thinking about the scale at which problems are
addressed, valorizing the metropolitan while leaving
less room for regional, state, federal or international
approaches (White, 2016). This downplaying of other
scales of governance is particularly relevant to issues of
climate change (Hollands, 2008). Cities might be large
sources of carbon, but this story also casts them as the
means to concentrate population in more compact and
efficient systems. Urbanization (as long as it is smart)
thus became a key response to climate change even as
industrial and consumption practices (as well as trea-
ties) operated at global and national scales.
The second trope, longstanding ideas associated with
neoliberalism’s focus on governmental bloat and the
need for privatization (Peck, 2005) have earlier ante-
cedents within entrepreneurial urbanism (see Molotch,
1976) or technology parks (O’Mara, 2005), and more
recent arguments around the creative class (Florida,
2002). Within this story urban governance becomes
managing a city in a competitive market of other
cities to attract a limited supply of investment and
showcasing a city’s brand even if it is largely vapor-
ware.4 Thus, smart city policies become a way for
urban managers to continue to provide public goods
as before—such as functioning transportation systems
to allow movement of goods and people—but with
fewer resources brought about by the austerity meas-
ures associated with competitive (i.e., lower) taxes.
The basic inputs to governance remain the same—data
traffic counts—but the sources and methods used to
collect them may shift from the public to the private
sector or entail a new approach to measuring.
Based on these twin stories, urban governance
becomes a matter of managing information technology
to efficiently construct data flows (big or otherwise),
which by their enactment defines what constitutes an
‘‘urban problem’’. Traffic counts are easy to capture
but metrics on ‘‘community’’ or ‘‘social justice’’ are
much more complex and thus less likely to be
quantified and incorporated. To be fair, this is not a
new issue caused by smart city policies as transporta-
tion policy has long been a key (and comparably easily
measured) element of urban governance. Smart city
approaches that include installing traffic sensors or col-
lecting mobile phone records (IBM, 2010) intensify
established practices rather than break completely
new ground. My concern is that precisely because
these data are easy to collect, smart city policies help
reify rather than question established practice, e.g. traf-
fic sensors aimed at vehicular traffic steer solutions in
certain modal directions rather than others such as
increasing pedestrian access.
To counter this tendency it is important to fore-
ground the processes by which different kinds of data
are collected, valorized and come to matter for
governance. For example, Taylor’s et al. (2014) project
collecting traffic counts is not for a centralized
transportation office, but rather at the request of local
residents interested in better understanding their neigh-
borhood. While this particular project was not tied to
the local transit authority (and thus likely does no con-
tribute to policy) this kind of participatory planning or
mapping is well established within urban governance
(Sieber et al., 2016). While participatory processes
are not straightforward, they represent a means
through which smart city metrics are grounded in
deep and nuanced understandings of place drawn
from citizens, planners and activists with long histories
and connections.
This kind of nuanced and engaged involvement in
urban governance, however, runs counter to many of
the observed practices of Big Data and social media in
which individuals become data. This is most obvious
within the private sector when our curated social
media output is resold and monetized as marketing
avenues but is also evident within the public section.
Experiments with social media by urban governments
enroll citizens either as recipients for official communi-
cations (Sobaci, 2016) or as sensors in data collection
projects, ranging from smart thermostats and demand
conservation to potholes identification. For example
the Street Bump (http://www.streetbump.org/) app
emerged from Boston’s New Urban Mechanics office
(tied to the Mayor) and uses smart phones’ accelerom-
eters to detect possible sites for road repair. The bumps
identified by the app ‘‘provide the city with real-time
information to fix short-term problems and plan long-
term investments.’’ While a clever application of avail-
able technology, it also raises concerns about the bias
of incoming data as the users of such an app—younger
and wealthier individuals—are likely to be clustered in
certain neighborhoods.5 Moreover, this role of citizens
as sensors (Goodchild, 2007) stands in contrast to a
more deeply engaged citizenry envisioned by Taylor’s
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et al. (2014) project and participatory planning. After
all, the role of sensors is to pass through data rather
than to question its significance or contribute to defin-
ing its meaning.
Encompassing unconscious contribution (cell phone
records, CCTV records) to a continuum of conscious
contributions (check-in, activity monitors, social
media) together create what Wilson (2015: 39) calls the
‘‘quantified self-city-nation, the flickering of screens, the
dynamics of real-time data and the prospect for behav-
ioural change intersect in a glossy imaginary where being
technologically fashionable and facile supersedes con-
cerns of differential docility.’’ In short, a reduction
of urbanity built on a series of self-referential and self-
replicating metrics that capture a specific (and generally
the most measurable) slice of the urban experience and
in turn shape the trajectory of future possibilities.
The banal, yet performative, role
of metrics
The role of smart cities metrics in producing a particu-
lar version of urbanity relates to Çalışkan and Callon
(2010) work (as well as earlier ANT theorists) on how
the expectations, metrics and institutions in markets are
established. Çalışkan and Callon (2010: 16, 23) high-
light the role of ‘‘material technologies’’ in structuring
markets, a point also emphasized by MacKenzie’s
(2006) work on the linkages between specific economic
models and resulting structure of financial markets.
Key to MacKenzie’s work is his argument that a spe-
cific material technology—in this case a financial model
called the Black–Scholes–Merton algorithm—was
adopted as a standard within financial markets largely
because it helped solve a variety of political and oper-
ational problems, rather than for its fundamental
accuracy. He continued this line of argument in later
work (Millo and MacKenzie, 2008: 8) highlighting the
way in which the Black–Scholes–Merton algorithm
provides legitimacy ‘‘by providing a stream of meth-
odologically valid information (although not always
realistically valid)’’. In other words, the model/metric
acted in a performative manner, helping to define the
reality of these financial markets rather than simply
describing them.
The metrics of smart cities are as productive of
urban experience as these risk algorithms are for the
financial markets, thus making understanding metrics,
Big Data and software algorithms a key area for urban
scholars. To date, studies of the social construction and
political economy of data and metrics have been rela-
tively underdeveloped with notable exceptions such as
Hacking’s (1990) argument about statistics ‘‘making
people up’’ or Bowker and Star (2000) exploration of
the role of standards and classification in ordering the
human society and interaction, particularly the largely
invisible ways in which this is enacted, normalized and
made natural.
While classification and data have long histories and
genealogies (see Crampton and Elden, 2006) including
applications to centralized governance (Medina, 2011),
there has been a recent intensification of metrics across
society (Ajana, 2013) and scales from themetropolitan to
the individual. Road sensors and CCTV provide streams
of information directly into urban governance sys-
tems while social media and a range of apps and highly
personalized devices such as Google Now6 or the Apple
Watch7 provide data streams at individualized levels
of granularity. This has profound effects on privacy, as
Lyon (2014: 4) argues ‘‘contemporary surveillance
expands exponentially—it renders ordinary everyday
lives increasingly transparent’’, often behind private cor-
porate firewalls.8 Thus, in addition to serving as sensors,
citizens are also intensively sensed and measured
within smart cities; a situation aligned with both the
priorities of neoliberalism and the new security appar-
atus of post-9/11 governance (Lyon, 2014: 9).
Performative smart city metrics
There have been many calls for more research on the
production of software and metrics in order to more
fully integrate these understandings within studies of
society and cities (Kitchin and Dodge, 2011). Ruppert
et al. (2013) argue for analyses of ‘‘‘the social life of
methods’ in order to better understand thewaysmethods
and data have moved outside of research practices and
into the social world’’ including urban governance.
Kitchin (2014a) calls for studies of the political economy
of data assemblages and related algorithms to better
understand how they enact economies, cultures and
cities at scales beyond the boldest visions of Project
Cybersyn. Far from stale, routine or boring, data and
metrics are deeply imbricated within daily practices as
events are measured and feed back into the ‘‘quantified
self-city-nation’’ (Wilson, 2015). In short, data/metrics
and code have emerged as central actants within social,
cultural and economic spheres within urban systems.
Given the malleable set of justifications for smart city
governance it is essential to engage in empirical studies
of the assemblages of sensors, data, information net-
works and management as they are produced in and
engage with pre-existing and specific systems of urban
governance. Earlier work has focused on the ways in
which software continually (re)produce urban space
(Kitchin andDodge, 2011; Thrift and French, 2002) pro-
vides differential access to parts of the city (Graham,
2005) as well as creates representation of the urban via
hybrid spaces and digital augmentations (Graham et al.,
2013; Zook and Graham, 2007a, 2007b).
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There are a number of examples of the productive
role of data/metrics within urban governance (in par-
ticular see Kitchin, 2014a); often via city websites that
offer various trackers and/or dashboards. Incidents of
crime, movements of city buses and dozens of other
metrics are tracked and in so doing redefine what the
city is (e.g., Rio de Janeiro’s Intelligent Operations
Center). Or at least what is worth measuring with the
city. The very banality of metrics and expectations
embedded in daily practice is their power; what
Wilson (2011) refers to as ‘‘formation of geocoding sub-
jects’’ or the ways in which data, classifications and
specific technologies are enlisted to construct particular
visions of the urban. This makes the control of metric
definition a key locus of power. Whoever gets to define
what ‘‘running a city better’’ actually means, whether it
be ranking the results of spatial searches (Zook and
Graham, 2007a, 2007b) or through the priorities of
smart city policy makers and consultants, occupies an
authoritative position.
This marks a significant expansion of the role of data
in cities. It is no longer simply a question of providing
inputs for understanding but evolving into a central
function of city and metropolitan governments along-
side (and in some cases supplanting) the long estab-
lished roles of policing, transit and social services.
Shelton (2014a) terms this practice as data-driven gov-
ernance or when ‘‘Data of all kinds—big and small,
open and proprietary, digital and analog, volunteered
or captured—is no longer simply a tool in the urban
planner or policymaker’s toolkit, but both a key input
and output of urban governance processes. Data is the
modus operandi and the raison d’etre of contemporary
urban governance.’’
Given this power associated with metrics in data-
driven governance, there have been regular calls for
and projects focused on community based data collec-
tion and mapping; the ‘‘map or be mapped’’ argument
(Bryan, 2007). While this represents one possible strat-
egy, we must also recognize that public visibility is not
appropriate (or sought) in all cases as data (particularly
for marginalized communities) has varying levels of
sensitivity (Young and Gilmore, 2014). Even commu-
nity-based projects with minimal privacy concerns are
not without problems. For example, Breen (2015)
explores a range of practices by which community
actors (encompassing a wide spectrum of ‘‘commu-
nity’’) define neighborhoods via metrics ranging from
arts and creativity to crowd-sourced signage. Successful
locally incubated projects, however, can be—either by
design or happenstance—transplanted in problematic
ways to new locales even when the focus is on some-
thing as seemingly unproblematic as the creation of
way-finding signs to increase neighborhood
walkability.
Anticipatory smart cities metrics
An additional key moment represented by smart cities
has been a shift to anticipatory governance, which no
longer seeks to make theoretical linkages to explain caus-
ation, but works to identify metrics through which urban
problems can be managed before they emerge. This kind
of anticipatory action has long been implemented in
business settings—Wal-Mart’s harnessing its transac-
tional records to stock stores prior to hurricanes and
Amazon’s recent patent for what it calls ‘‘anticipatory
shipping’’ (Bensinger, 2014)—but increasingly Big Data
and smart cities are distinguished by an anticipatory
orientation (Lyon, 2014; White, 2016).
Because this orientation is based on the specific data
that have been created for and deployed within smart
cities, these metrics and their associate logics help shape
what kinds of futures are allowed to unfold; or as
Kinsley (2012: 1557) argues they help ‘‘stabilize how
particular futures play out’’. In a similar manner
Amoore (2013: 9, emphasis in original) argues that
anticipatory logic ‘‘acts not strictly to prevent the play-
ing out of a particular course of events on the basis of
past data tracked forward into probable futures, but to
preempt an unfolding and emergent event in relation
to an array of possible projected futures. It seeks not
to forestall the future via calculation but to incorporate
the very knowability and profound uncertainty of the
future into imminent decision . . .To manage risks
ahead of time is to enroll modes of calculation that
can live with emergence itself, embrace and incorporate
the capacity for error, false positive, mistake and anom-
aly’’. Anticipatory logic is particularly useful in justify-
ing smart city governance and metrics as a logical
and efficient response to the tropes of growing urban-
ization during climate change as well competitiveness
during austerity. With these stories stabilizing a narra-
tive of crisis, smart city metrics are thus easily and
unproblematically put forward as the solution to
‘‘run a city better.’’
Geosocial media metrics in urban
governance
Geosocial media data—geotagged content created by
individuals and shared through social media and access-
ible for collection by others—have become increasingly
prevalent as mobile technologies have emerged, contri-
buting to what some have called a ‘data revolution’
(Kitchin, 2014a). Through geosocial media it is possible
to measure and analyze a wide range of everyday social,
economic and political activities (Poorthuis et al., 2016)
of interest to urbanists, particular when combined with
other Big Data types—collected by sensors or produced
through intentional crowd-sourcing projects. Often,
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however, ‘‘big’’ is simplistically equated with ‘‘better’’
resulting in metrics and maps that may be easy to
digest and pleasing to the eye but which produce realities
that mischaracterize and constrain.
What does geosocial media data represent?
One must be mindful of the biases of social media data
which—on average—tend to be over-representative of
wealthy people and places (Graham and Zook, 2011) as
well as being skewed in terms of gender (Stephens,
2013). Digital social data is always a selective represen-
tation of social reality and one must be cautious in
its use as well as critical of approaches, which pre-
sume the neutrality of data. Moreover, building upon
Goodchild’s (2007) concept of volunteered geographic
information (VGI) it is crucial to engage with the con-
cept of ‘‘volunteered’’ as often geosocial media results
from individuals’ actions but not their conscious deci-
sion or is largely reflexively created (e.g., tweets or
Facebook posts that are a matter of habit but open
to repurposing by others). As a result there are import-
ant ethical issues associated with the use of big geoso-
cial media data in research, a point that has not escaped
the US National Science Foundation and other funding
agencies (Holdren, 2013).
Still because social media data is relatively easy to
capture and analyze in real time, it is increasingly
attractive as a data source for urban analysis. To be
sure, social media has great potential for understanding
new elements of cities and thus (if used well) could pro-
vide new insights for urban governance (Poorthuis
et al., 2016). Analyzing the world with geosocial
media data rather than census data does not necessarily
require new methods but does bring different chal-
lenges, such as the unstructured nature of much of
the data making it difficult to conduct meaningful
research. In short, unless one is careful in using this
data—cleaning, interpreting, etc.—one is likely to run
afoul of GIGO (garbage in, garbage out) and produce
insights that are hyped as insightful but upon further
consideration are not as instructive as they might be.
For example, a recent map by Eric Fisher was touted
by the public relations department of MapBox as the
‘‘Most Detailed Tweet Map Ever’’ (https://www.
mapbox.com/blog/twitter-map-every-tweet/), as it was
based on a dataset of 6.3 billion tweets. This was a
problematic characterization subject to critique on a
number of levels. Firstly, due to standard cartographic
practice and limits to the processing power of browsers,
the actual map eliminated about 90 percent of all tweets
since many points were over-plotted. Not really an issue
per se but the marketing tagline of a 6.3 billion-tweet
map runs counter to basic cartography. This also pro-
vides an apt example of how the interpretation of data
and analysis transcends the details of production
(known by the analysts and those who read and are
able to understand footnotes and appendices) and the
urban official and citizen who use the product to under-
stand their city. In short, the contingent and constructed
nature of analysis and map are often rendered opaque
for the end user.
Also problematic is the reification of ‘‘(1) that more
data is equivalent to better data, and (2) that the only
important aspect of the data is the geographic coordin-
ates attached to it.’’ (Shelton, 2014b). The latter point is
particularly relevant to smart city governance as plan-
ners and geographers often concentrate on the loca-
tional dimension of this data—the latitude/longitude
coordinates. There is, however, an enormous amount
of non-geographic information—networks, contexts,
user self-description—associated with geosocial media
data that can be leveraged for use (Crampton et al.,
2013). This represents exciting new opportunities for
urban governance to explore relational and temporal
questions —What parts of the city are used by different
populations? How do the functions of neighborhoods
change over the course of the day or week?—that pre-
viously were difficult to pursue.
Local government use of geosocial media
The ways in which urban governments deploy existing
and adopt novel datasets are evolving. Perhaps the
most advanced is the promotion of ‘‘open data’’—
largely government datasets made publically and
easily available for reuse in the expectation that new
services for citizens could be developed independent
of state action. Towards this end, many local govern-
ments have promoted hackathons—gatherings of vol-
unteer software developers tasked with making new
apps for local use—which have achieved mixed success
along with raising concerns about regular government
procurement (Johnson and Robinson, 2014). Relatedly
citizen groups and non-profits have worked to engage
local governments through the creation (or crowd-
sourcing) of new datasets that represent concerns his-
torically outside the purview of local government data
creation and collection. A meta-analysis of 12 cases of
the use of public participation via geosocial networks
and other digital tools by citizen groups in Canada
shows that the nature and conditions of participation
are evolving (Sieber et al., 2016). Some existing inequal-
ities between citizens are seemingly solidified and the
reviewers worry whether these digital tools and net-
works are increasing individualism empowerment at
the expense collective engagement to influence deci-
sion-making.
Looking specifically at the reliance of social media
by local governments reveals that efforts are largely
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exploratory (see Sobaci, 2016 for recent and wide-
ranging review). Kavanaugh et al.’s (2012) relatively
early look at the use of social media by local govern-
ments and identified issues of how best to monitor
social media communications and process the often
overwhelming deluge of incoming data. The expect-
ation is that social media can serve as a potential
means to allow for more citizen inputs (Janssen and
Helbig, 2016) and increase openness and accountability
(Stamati et al., 2015). The most prominent use cases
for this aspect of social media were in situations
where real-time communications were paramount,
such as emergency management. This ability to leverage
social media during emergency has been shown effective
in other cases (Bird et al., 2012), including more general
cases of crowd-sourcing maps rather than social media
(Zook et al., 2010).
The main example of local governmental use of social
media is unfortunately also the most problematic,
namely utilizing social media posts as an intelligence
source for policing. In October 2016, the American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) reported that police
departments were using the services of a social media
development company to monitor the activities of pro-
testors. The company in question, Geofeedia, noted in
its promotional activities to police departments that its
feeds of Twitter, Facebook and Instagram data ‘‘covered
Ferguson/Mike Brown nationally with great success’’
(Cagle, 2016). This type of use of social media clearly
raises concerns that local governments might stray
towards an Orwellian big brother state in which citizens
are tracked and recorded.
Social media and socio-spatial theories
One example of using geosocial media in arguably more
constructive ways is Shelton et al.’s (2015) analysis of
Twitter data to study mobility and segregation in
Louisville. While not numbering in the billions, it did
involve some large numbers, starting with a dataset of
close to 6 million tweets that were reduced to 600,000
based on series of filters identifying a set of users
engaged in a particular type of behavior. In this case,
people who were primarily active in one of two areas
within the city and sustained this action over time. The
goal was to combine concepts of relational socio-spatial
theory with the methods of critical GIScience, in order
to explore the spatial imaginaries and processes of seg-
regation and mobility in Louisville (see Figure 3).
The topic of mobility and segregation—social ills of
mid-sized US cities—reflects the situated nature of
smart city research and cases studies from other parts
Figure 3. Unevenly segregated activity spaces of Louisville, KY (Shelton et al., 2015).
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of the world focused on different measures of well-
being.
The results highlight the dynamic and porous nature
of neighborhoods in Louisville which runs counter
to standard narratives of unbridgeable divides. In
Figure 3, this is demonstrated by the extent to which
people from the West End (a predominantly poor and
African-American neighborhood) are mobile and active
throughout the city (represented by purple shading)
and regularly cross ‘‘the 9th Street divide’’ (marked in
red) a locally well-known and racially based boundary.
In contrast, those from the East Enders (a predomin-
antly affluent and white area) were more spatially seg-
regated and less likely to cross the divide (see the
orange shading). To be sure, documenting mobility
for these neighborhoods in Louisville does not invali-
date other approaches to mobility and their findings.
For example, Pendall and Hedman’s (2015) study of
income inequality within commuting zones (similar to
metropolitan areas but encompassing the entirety of the
US) has increased from 1990 to 2010, including the
specific case of Louisville.
The goal of using Twitter to study mobility was not
to build an anticipatory logic but nevertheless contrib-
ute to making the city ‘‘run better’’ by providing an
alternative understanding of how segregation and
neighborhoods work in the case of Louisville.
‘‘Ultimately, we wish to reiterate that we are not
arguing that geotagged social media data is an
unequivocal improvement on, or replacement for,
other forms of social and spatial data, especially
when analyzing questions of inequality. But rather
than reinscribing these inequalities through the use of
such datasets, we would argue that our analysis has
shown that this kind of social media data represents a
potentially rich source from which to construct empiri-
cally-grounded counter narratives of these inequalities
and popular socio-spatial imaginaries thereof, which in
turn can allow for alternative conceptualizations of,
and interventions into, urban socio-spatial relations
and processes.’’
And while this work uses ‘‘Big Data’’ of great inter-
est to more positivist approaches to smart cities, it is
also an analysis that is very much based on the kind of
longstanding and situated knowledge that is increas-
ingly discounted within smart cities in favor of more
quantifiable metrics. This is a key point of emphasis
since the priorities of smart city governance often deva-
lue the grounded local knowledge that has been part
and parcel of the long 20th century of the community
or advocacy planner. This often comes in terms of
opportunity costs. For example, are resources spent
on hiring an urban data scientist to build metrics for
an Urban Dashboard (along with associated backend
models and Big Data feeds) or for neighborhood facili-
tators who work with community groups and produce
less easily visualized data and insight? These decisions
are made across cities and will shape what metrics and
data are available for urban governance.
Conclusion—Running cities better
In this essay I show both the historical depth of central
ideas within smart city governance—particular the idea
that enough data/information/knowledge can solve soci-
ety problems—but also the ways that the most recent
version differs. Two key things stand out: (1) the rise
of a certain kind of data metrics and (2) the role of
a specific type of ideological bent—neoliberalism—that
is closely tied (albeit not reducible) to technology
corporations. Although these two points are closely
interlinked—particularly the way in which metrics are
selected and promoted according to ideology—it is con-
ceptually useful to consider each in turn.
First, I argue that we should not to simply reject the
use of Big Data metrics as one means to help to run
cities better. In this I echo Kitchin’s contention that ‘‘it
is possible to think of new epistemologies that do not
dismiss or reject Big Data analytics, but rather employ
the methodological approach of data-driven science
within a different epistemological framing that enables
social scientists to draw valuable insights from Big
Data that are situated and reflexive.’’ (2014b: 9–10).
Kitchin’s (2014a) ongoing Programmable City project
including working directly with the City of Dublin to
create an urban dashboard is one such approach as is
Miller and Goodchild’s (2015) call for data driven geo-
graphies and the example used earlier from Shelton
et al. (2015).
The second point about ideology brings me full circle
back to the email from the anonymous urban inform-
atics specialist and their desire to use data to ‘‘run a city
better.’’ While I have used this offhand comment as a
foil in this piece, I am not unsympathetic to the intent it
represents; after all, a similar sentiment can be found
throughout city planning theory and practice and is
ultimately what led me to my present career. What
does give me pause, however, is what I fear to be the
conflicting motivations and ideological underpinning
behind this goal of betterment as represented by this
email. Namely, that the drive to ‘‘run a city better’’ is
related to ongoing pitches advanced by a particular con-
stellation of actors—technology firms, start-up entrepre-
neurs and city officials operating under the dual stories
of urbanization and neoliberalization (White, 2016).
This stands in marked contrast to the strong social just-
ice themes within planning (c.f. Davidoff, 1965) as
well as the ideas within the Project Cybersyn of using
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cybernetics as a technology of liberation on behalf of
the people (Medina, 2011). While one could certainly
critique the feasibility or desirability of the Chilean pro-
ject, it was couched in a larger project and ideology
dedicated to the betterment of society.
In the current smart city, the connection to societal
betterment is much less certain and clouded by layers of
marketing and branding. For example, Wiig (2015)
examines the example of Philadelphia’s participation
in IBM’s smarter city challenge and argues that the
effort was more indicative of a branding exercise that
falls in line with a long history of municipal economic
development. In other words, ‘‘The smart city acted as
a digitized facsimile of the entrepreneurial city.
A techno-utopian policy masked global ambitions, sig-
naling a city as ‘‘a smart city full of economic vitality’’
that was ‘‘not a radical break from past efforts at eco-
nomic policymaking, but as an extension of them.’’
Thus, one need be cautious in evaluating the potential
of smart city governance as well as the associated met-
rics. There is promise; geosocial media data and metrics
derived from them can provide useful insight and policy
direction. But one must be ever mindful that metrics
don’t simply measure; in the process of deciding what
is important and possible to measure, these data are
simultaneously defining what cities are.
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Notes
1. My reaction was also colored by the background of the
sender who educational background was in math and
physics rather than the social sciences.
2. An important albeit tangential point is to contrast the
smart city focus on metrics with other proposed strategies
for studying the emerging data-derived and virtual dimen-
sion of cities. This includes (Apostol et al., 2013) the pro-
posal for the ‘‘practice of flânerie in the physical and
virtual space as a method to produce representative
images of contemporary social life’’ or Kingsbury and
Jones’ (2009) depiction of Google Earth as an ‘‘alluring
digital peep-box, an uncertain orb spangled with vertigin-
ous paranoia, frenzied navigation, jubilatory dissolution,
and intoxicating giddiness’’. While neither of these
approaches were as explicitly governance focused as
smart cities, Apostol et al. (2013: 30) do see ‘‘tremendous
potential in building community identity and improving
the level of citizen participation in public deliberations.’’
3. This was an idea I first heard as a planning graduate stu-
dent in the 1990s and I distinctly remember being told that
‘‘You are the first generation of planners who will work in
a majority urban world’’. It certainly stuck in my mind and
now it is hard to find something on smart cities where a
similar sentiment is not voiced.
4. Vaporware refers to the practice within the software indus-
try of announcing products before they are actually avail-
able, and in some cases, before they are actually written.
Perhaps in the case of smart cities we should refer to this
kind of public relations and branding as ‘‘vapor-where’’.
5. Ironically, at time this paper was written the website’s
banner listed ‘‘549 trips, 37,016 bumps, 0 potholes filled,
and 0 roadway problems identified’’ which, if true, repre-
sents a remarkable disconnect between the collection of
data metrics and actual governance.
6. As per the advertising copy ‘‘Your information is automat-
ically organized into simple cards that appear just when
they’re needed. Now cards are ready whenever you are so
you can spend less time digging and more time living. Now
cards deliver the information you care about, without you
having to search for it.’’
7. As per the advertising copy ‘‘Our goal has always been to
make powerful technology more accessible. More relevant.
And ultimately, more personal. Apple Watch represents a
new chapter in the relationship people have with technol-
ogy. It’s the most personal product we’ve ever made,
because it’s the first one designed to be worn. . . .Over
time, Apple Watch learns your activity and fitness levels.
It uses that information to improve the accuracy of your
measurements and suggest personalized all-day activity
goals. It even provides custom reminders to encourage
you to achieve them.’’
8. An additional issue beyond the scope of this paper is that
the new sources of data from social media are owned/
controlled by private companies which coincides with a
simultaneous roll-back from state-derived data sources
(Leszczynski, 2012), most recently exemplified by the can-
cellation of the American Community Survey (ACS)
3-Year Statistical Product (US Census, 2015).
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